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Dynamic contracts with multiple agents is a classical decentralized decision-making problem with asymmetric
information. In this paper, we extend the single-agent dynamic incentive contract model in continuous-time
to a multi-agent scheme in finite horizon and allow the terminal reward to be dependent on the history of
actions and incentives. We first derive a set of sufficient conditions for the existence of optimal contracts
in the most general setting and conditions under which they form a Nash equilibrium. Then we show that
the principal’s problem can be converted to solving Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation requiring a
static Nash equilibrium. Finally, we provide a framework to solve this problem by solving partial differential
equations (PDE) derived from backward stochastic differential equations (BSDE).
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1. Introduction
Dynamic contract theory has been used for many practical problems ranging from corporate finance
to strategic behavior in politics to organizational design. A principal (“She”) is a person or entity
who constructs a contract and an agent (“He”) decides to possibly accept it. A dynamic contact
defines the payoff received by the agent depending on his exerted effort during each period the
contract is in effect. The principal needs to characterize all admissible contracts and implement
one that maximizes her expected revenue from the cash flow. Some early work on principal-agent
problem in repeated games includes the two-period problem of Rogerson (1985), infinite repeated
moral hazard problem of Spear and Srivastava (1987), renegotiation in long-term contract problem
of Hart and Tirole (1988), and asymptotic efficiency contract of Fudenberg, Holmstrom, Milgrom
(1990) ([11, 13, 9, 8]). In this paper, we focus on the dynamic incentive contract (i.e. moral hazard)
problem where agents actions are not observable by the principal. In this case, the first-best contract
is not admissible since a contract conditioned on agent’s verifiable actions cannot be implemented.
This could be because it may be too costly, impossible or difficult to monitor the agent’s actions
directly. In such a situation, the principal can only offer an incentive contract which rewards the
agent according to the level of revenue he generates and she receives.
In the groundbreaking work, Sannikov (2008) developed a continuous-time approach to the
dynamic principal-agent problem, using some ideas of Holmstrom and Milgrom who described
the continuous-time output process as a Brownian motion about twenty years ago([12, 10]). As
is the case in a discrete model, an agent only cares about his continuation value resulting from
his current action. The principal receives the payoff determined by an output process whose drift
term is determined by the agent’s action and the diffusion term is assumed to be a Brownian
Motion. The value functions of both the principal and the agent, in this continuous setting, are
Martingales with respect to the filtration of the Brownian motion. Both the agent and the principal
solve two embedded dynamic programming problems to determine the target continuation values.
This continuous-time framework models the dynamics of the process analytically and bypasses the
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problems that arise due to the curse of dimensionality which results from the enormous state space
of a history-dependent contract. This is done by choosing the agents continuation value as the
state variable for the principals problem, thus avoiding the explosion of the state space [12]. This
continuous approach can also model different and correlated stochasticity which is difficult, if not
impossible, to model using the discrete approach. For instance, the principal can control the initial
condition, drift terms, diffusion terms, and solve the contract in time-variant interest rate setting
[1, 3, 4, 15].
Though both discrete-time and continuous-time methods find the optimal policy by solving the
Bellman and the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equations respectively, each has strengths and
weaknesses with regard to the computational efficiency. Discrete-time model can be reformulated
with objective function and constraints linear in probability, and thus can be converted to linear
programming (LP) subproblems. Continuous-time method solves BSDE so it is harder to program
computers to solve (we show in this note that the multi-agent problem can be solved by a series of
parabolic nonlinear PDE). However, the dimensionality of each linear program grows exponentially
with the time horizon and this curse of dimensionality vanishes in the continuous-time models.
Discrete-time dynamic multi-agent contract problems have been relatively well studied, but only
recently researchers have focused the optimal strategy for the continuous-time problem in a multi-
agent setting. A linear extension of the drift term in this multi-agent setting has been looked at
by Thakur with the aim of finding the optimal size of team (number of agents) when dividing
work between them [14]. In the trivial linear setting, the only direct interaction between agents
is through the cost function which is assumed to be a decreasing function of the team size. To
the best of our knowledge, the pioneering paper that discusses the Nash Equilibrium as a concept
to connect the decisions of competitive interacting agents in this general setting is by Elie and
Possamai [6, 7]. The characterization of the Nash equilibrium to the multidimensional BSDE as well
as the existence of such equilibrium in this general setting are both discussed with the assumption
that the mapping from agents’ actions to drift term of the principal’s output is uniformly Lipschitz
continuous. However, the authors presume the existence of equilibrium, and disregard the complex
issue of simultaneously finding the equilibrium and optimizing admissible contracts in the multi-
agent setting.
Our contribution to the contract theory literature include proving a set of sufficient conditions
for the existence of optimal contracts in continuous-time multi-agent problem, as well as providing
the algorithm for solving the optimal contracts in the most general setting. Compared to previous
work, we generalize the forms of output processes, utility and aggregate functions, expanding the
application domains of this methodology.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We first describe the setting of a continuous-time
single-principal multi-agent problem in Section 2. In accordance with procedures to solve optimal
dynamic contract, we first characterize the agents’ problem as a static subproblem in Section 3.
Multi-agent requires more effort to prove the existence of sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium in
Section 4. Next we formulate the principal’s problem as a HJB equation based on specified agents’
actions at equilibrium in Section 5 and in Section 6 we give some insight into solving the optimal
contract. Finally the Section 7 presents our conclusions and some possible future directions.
2. Setting
There is one principal (subscripted as “P”) and n agents, signing a contract simultaneously at
time t= 0. Each agent is indexed by i, i ∈ {1,2, . . . n} and (subscripted as “i”). A contract signed
between the principal and an agent i specifies the compensations ci(t) this agent will receive by
putting effort ai(t) in working for the principal at time t ∈ [0, T ]. The vectors of n agents’ actions
and compensations are denoted as a(t) and c(t) respectively. There is a terminal payoff Φi at the
end of time horizon T <∞. We argue that the infinite horizon is a special case where T =∞ and
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there is no terminal payoff. In this case, an analogous approach from this paper still works but
with additional transversality conditions to guarantee the existence of optimal contracts on the
interval including ∞. On the other hand, the state space at each t is reduced because of removing
boundary conditions. In continuous-time model, the order of realizing payments and determining
the effort levels becomes irrelevant.
We allow the terminal payoff for n agents Φ to be history-dependent, i.e. Φ is a vector of functions
of {a(t),c(t)}0≤t≤T . For example, the terminal payoff for agent i denoted as Φi can be a possibly a
nonlinear function of Zi(T ) where Z(t) is the sum total of the agents’ actions from 0 to t
Z(t) =
∫ t
0
a(s)ds. (1)
or of some other functions of the actions and/or incentives. In the general case we represent the
dynamics of Z for i= 1, · · · , n as
dZi(t) = rµZi(a(t),c(t))dt+ rσZidBZ(t) (2)
where µZi ,σZi are deterministic functions of appropriate dimension, and BZ is an m dimensional
vector of independent Brownian motions.
The expected utility the agent i draws from a contact is Ui, and the total utility the principal
obtains from signing contracts with n agents is UP . We assume that the instantaneous payoff
received by the agent i at time t∈ [0, T ] is
ui(a(t), ci(t)) (3)
where the principal’s decision variable is the compensation ci(t) in domain Ci ⊆R, and the agent
i’s decision variable is his effort level ai(t) in domain Ai ⊆R. Both domains are agent-dependent,
and their Cartesian products are denoted as C and A. In an uncertain environment, the output
processes associated with n agents’ actions is a vector X (t) = [X1(t), . . . ,Xn(t)]. Each Xi(t) follows
the process:
dXi(t) = fi(a(t))dt+σ idB(t) (4)
The drift term fi : A→ R+ in Equation (4) is in L2 space such that
∫ T
0
f2i ds <∞. fi is dif-
ferentiable almost everywhere with respect to ai(t). The diffusion term can be interpreted as the
principal’s observations on each agent’s actual actions contain noises and these noises may be inter-
correlated. Let FBt represent the filtration generated by the Brownian motions B(t) and BZ(t),
and we assume that the m dimensional Brownian motions B and BZ are independent. This is the
extension of the output process proposed by Holmstrom and Milgram [10] with most general direct
interactions between n agents.
Due to non-tractable actions, the principal offers agent i a contract based on Xi to indirectly
influence his actions over the horizon. The agent then chooses strategy {ai(t)}0≤t≤T that provides
himself optimal returns. The principal also requires that these n agents implement the desired
actions concurrently. This is achieved by assuring that the agents’ actions constitute a Nash equi-
librium, which then disincentivizes the agent i from deviating from the target action ai(t) for
all i. An implementable and optimal dynamic contract must maximize the principal’s utility UP
under incentive-compatible (IC) and individual-rational (IR) constraints. We consider the case in
which the participation constraint is only imposed at time zero. The IC-constraints are derived
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from analyzing agents’ problems. The utility functions are as follows where ui : A× Ci→ R and
uP :A×C →R are the instantaneous utility at time t for agent i and principal respectively1:
Ui =E
a
[∫ T
0
re−rsui(a(s), ci(s))ds+ re
−rTΦi(Zi(T ))
]
(5)
UP =E
a
[∫ T
0
re−rs [uP (a(s),c(s))]ds− r1ᵀ · e−rTΦ(Z(T ))
]
(6)
In this work, all information about the processes and functions is private, and known only to
the specific agents or principal, and the only shared information between agent i and the principal
is the agent i’s output Xi(t) at time t. To assure that the actions of the agents constitute a
Nash equilibrium, we assume that there is a third, neutral party who acts as a ‘messenger’. The
messenger has access to the agents actions, the principal’s offered compensations and the processes
and functions of each agent. It also has power to convince the agents that the actions indeed form
a Nash equilibrium and thus must be adapted by the agents, The messenger informs the principal
of the actions of the agents at the equilibrium so that the principal can maximize UP (or the
messenger can include this iteration within its algorithms). This is an implicit assumption in most
multi-agent models and negotiation theory.
3. Individual Agent’s Problem
In this section, we solve a single agent’s problem given a fixed contract. Since the agents interact
with the principal via individual contracts, we can adapt the framework and the methodology of
Sannikov[12] for the proofs of the results we obtain in this work 2.
We assume that the instantaneous payoff the agent i receives3 is given by Equation (3). Then
the continuation payoff Wi(t) is the agent i’s expected payoff received from t to T is defined as:
Wi(t) =E
a
[∫ T
t
re−r(s−t)ui(a(s), ci(s))ds+ re
−r(T−t)Φi(Zi(T ))|FBt
]
(7)
The two propositions that follow are proved in Sannikov in the infinite horizon case. The proofs
carry over with almost no modifications for our case, even though we consider the finite horizon
case with discounting. Thus we skip the proofs and refer the reader to [12].
Proposition 1. For a fixed contract with finite utility for agent i, the dynamic evolution of
his continuation payoff is determined by the SDE:
dWi(t) = r (Wi(t)−ui(a(t), ci(t)))dt+ rYi(t)σidB(t) (8)
for some process Yi(t) that is adapted to FBt . Conversely, Wi(t) satisfying the SDE is the agent i’s
continuation payoff.
Proposition 1 introduces a new process Yi(t) as “the sensitivity of the agent’s continuation payoff
Wi(t) to output Xi(t)” by the martingale representation theorem. When solving the individual
agent’s problem, we can use the one-shot deviation principle so that it is equivalent to the optimality
of actions {a(t)}0≤t≤T to conditions on {Yi(t)}0≤t≤T as a series of static subproblems. Therefore,
the principal only needs to send Y(t) = [Y1(t), . . . Yn(t)]
ᵀ to the messenger when searching for
equilibrium.
1 In what follows, 1 is a n-dimensional identity vector. Φ(Z(T )) = [Φ1(Z1(T )), . . . ,Φn(Zn(T ))]
ᵀ.
2 However, solving the individual agent problem does not mean that these contracts are mutually independent since
the output process include the interactions among n agents.
3 Agent i′s return at t from compensation ci(t) and the cost to agents for taking action a(t).
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The key result in Proposition 1 is that an optimal contract can be written in terms of the
state descriptor vector (W (t),Z(t)). The principal needs to specify these in individual contracts:
(a) functions for the consumption process ci(W (t),Z(t)) for each agent i; (b) functions of the
target effort process ai(W (t),Z(t)) for each agent i; (c) the laws of motion of continuation payoff
Wi(t) for all agents i driven by output X (t). An incentive compatible contract that provides
consistent information for the three items and maximize the principals utility UP is optimal and
implementable. The arguments for retirement at all t∈ [0, T ] are still valid for multi-agent setting
since one can take actions 0 at t (retire and Wi(s) = 0 for s ≥ t) to guarantee himself a strictly
positive Ui. For simplicity of notation, we denote a vector as x = [x1, . . . , xi, . . . , xn] = [x−i, xi] in
what follows.
Proposition 2. For any fixed a−i(t), the contracted payment ci(t) for the agent i is incentive-
compatible if and only if strategy {ai(t)} satisfies
ai(t) = arg max
a˜i(t)∈Ai
[Yi(t)fi(a−i(t), a˜i(t)) +ui(a−i(t), a˜i(t), ci(t))] (9)
for all t∈ [0, T ].
Without considering the Nash Equilibrium, agent i’s problem at time t is to maxai(t)E [Ui|FBt ].
However, it is not sufficient for the principal to control process Wi(t) to find the incentive-
compatible contract {ci(t), Yi(t)} separately as in the single-agent setting. Noticing that ui and fi
are both functions of all agents decision variables, there are strong interactions among agents. To
assure that UP is maximized, the principal needs to ensure that there is no agent i who can benefit
by deviating from the target ai(t). This can be done by choosing the target effort level a(t)to
be a Nash Equilibrium at each time t ∈ [0, T ]. In the next section, we present a set of sufficient
conditions for the existence of such an equilibrium.
4. Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium
In this section we prove the existence of a Nash Equilibrium for each given y and c, which is incentive
compatible, as defined by Equation (9). This will be shown under the following assumptions on
the functions ui and fi for all i:
1. ui :A×Ci→R is twice continuously differentiable, increasing in c, and concave.
2. fi :A→R+ is twice continuously differentiable, increasing and concave.
3. For each i and a, fi(a−i, ai)→∞ as ai→∞, and ∂f(a)∂ai 6= 0 .
4. The set ∩i{(a,c) : ui(a, ci)≥ 0 for all i} is nonempty and compact.
5. There exists an m> 0 such that m< supx ui(a−i, x, ci), and ui→−∞ as x→∞, for all i and
a−i, ci.
6. ui(a−i,0, ci)≥ 0 for each a−i, ci.
It is easy to check that Sannikov’s single-agent contract is a special case where u is separable
with regard to a(t) and c(t) and f(a(t)) = a(t). Assumption (4) is satisfied because an agent can
take action ai(t) = 0 and his utility will be 0, which means the intersection of sets is not empty.
Assumption (6) is valid by the same argument that ai(t) /∈ Ai if ui < 0. As a consequence of our
Assumptions (1) - (6) above we can prove:
Lemma 1. Let g
a(t),ci(t)
i (x) =
−u′(a−i(t), x, ci(t))
f ′(a−i(t), x)
. g
a(t),ci(t)
i is continuously differentiable and
monotone increasing as a function of x in the domain Ai. Also, there exist 0≤ βi < γi such that
for each βi < y < γi and (a,c)∈R2n, ga,cii (x) = y has a solution.
Proof of Lemma 1: Follows from properties (1) and (2) respectively of ui and fi, is well defined
from property (3) of f ′, i.e., it is nonzero, and the property (1) of ui i.e., it is concave. Define
γi = limx→∞ infα∈Rn+1g
α
i (x) which may be infinite, and βi = max{0,maxα∈Rn+1gαi (0)}. Let y ∈ [βi, γi]
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and define infαg
α
i (xˆ) = y. Such an xˆ exists since the function infαg
α
i is monotone increasing. Now,
gαi (xˆ)≥ y and gαi (0)≤ βi the result follows from the continuity of gαi and the intermediate value
theorem.
As a consequence of Lemma 1, define a set Y =∏i[βi, γi].
Definition 1. The agents effort a is called a Nash Equilibrium if and only if deviation by one
agent from the stipulated action in a while the other agents follow their stipulated actions will
result in a loss to the agent. This can be stated mathematically as: for each i= 1, · · · , n
ai ∈ Γi(a−i, ci, yi) = {xˆ : xˆ= arg max
x
[yifi(a−i, x) +ui(a−i, x, ci)]} (10)
We now prove a simple lemma to characterize the equilibrium:
Lemma 2. For almost all t ∈ [0, T ], and each y(t) ∈ Y and c(t) ∈ C, if the Nash Equilibrium
a(t) exists, it lies in the set
⋂
i{(a, ci) : ui(a, ci)≥ 0}.
Proof of Lemma 2: For any given y(t),c(t), let a(t) be a Nash equilibrium for some t∈ [0, T ]
and let ui(a(s), ci(s))< 0 for some i, and s, t ∈ (t1, t2). Thus
∫ t2
t1
ui(a−i(s), ai(s), ci(s))ds < 0. But,
from property (6),
∫ t2
t1
ui((a−i(s),0, ci(s))ds≥ 0. Thus a(t) is not a Nash equilibrium, thus a con-
tradiction. The Lemma 2 follows from the fact that ui(a−i(t), ai(t), ci(t))< 0 on a set of measure 0
in [0, T ].
We show now that no agent has an incentive to leave before the terminal time if a Nash equilib-
rium for the actions of agents is adapted.
Corollary 1. A consequence of the implementation of the Nash equilibrium is that no agent
has an incentive to leave before the terminal time T .
Proof of Corollary 1 As is seen in the proof of Lemma 2 the Nash equilibrium gives the agent
positive immediate return, thus making the total return an increasing function of the continuation
time.
We now establish the existence of a Nash equilibrium in the theorem as follows.
Theorem 1. For each given y(t)∈Y and c(t)∈ C, there exists a Nash Equilibrium a(t)∈A.
Proof of Theorem 1: For a fixed agent i, given the concavity of the functions in Equa-
tion (8), a necessary and sufficient condition for xˆ to solve the optimization problem is
that g
a(t),ci(t)
i (xˆ) = yi(t). We note that as defined in Equation (10) Γi(a(t), ci(t), yi(t)) =
{x : ga(t),ci(t)i (x) = yi(t)}. Now define a point-to-set map Γ(a(t)) = Γc(t),y(t)(a(t)) =
[Γ1(a(t), c1(t), y1(t))), · · · ,Γn(a(t), cn(t), yn(t)))]. Note that Γ :A→A∗, where A∗ is the set of all
compact and convex subsets of A. To see that Γ is a upper hemi continuous point to set map, let
ak be a sequence in A that converges to a. Also let xk ∈ Γ(ak) for each k such that xk converges to
x. To see that x is in Γ(a) we note that xki is such that g
ak(t),ci(t)
i (x
k
i ) = yi(t). From the definition
of gi in Lemma 1, it is a continuous function of a, thus yi(t) = limk→∞g
ak (t),ci(t)
i (x
k) = g
a(t),ci(t)
i (x)
for each i. The existence of a Nash Equilibrium now follows from Lemma 2, property (4) and the
Kakutani Fixed Point Theorem.
5. The Optimum Contract
In this section, we solve the principal’s problem given that agents take actions at the Nash Equi-
librium as in Section 4.
The principal’s problem is as follows:
UP = max{c(t),a(t)∈Θ(c(t),y(t)),0≤t≤T}
E
[∫ T
0
re−rs (uP (a(y(s))),c(s))ds− re−rT1ᵀ ·Φ(Z(T ))
]
(11)
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where Θ(c(t),y(t)) is the set of Nash equilibria for given {c(t),y(t)}.
Let the solution c∗,y∗ to the principal’s problem exist and define the principal’s optimum return
from some t > 0 to T as
RP (t) = max{c(s),y(s),s≥t}
E[f(a)]
[
r
∫ T
t
e−r(u−t) (uP (a(y(u)),c(u))du− re−r(T−t)1ᵀ ·Φ(Z(T ))|FBt
]
(12)
and note that the solution as defined, is c∗,y∗. We now make an
Assumption 1. We assume that the value Rp(t) has the following C
1,2,2 functional4 form
FP (t,W (t),Z(t)) of t, the agents’ continuation vector W (t) and the termination value descriptor
vector Z(t)5.
Thus the optimum value received by the principal is given by
UP (t) = r
∫ t
0
e−rs (uP (a(y
∗(s)),c∗(s)))ds+ e−rtFP (t,W (t),Z(t)) (13)
It is easy to show (see Sannikov [12]) that UP (t) defined by Equation (13) is a Martingale, and
thus has zero drift. Applying Ito’s multidimensional lemma and the dynamics ofW (t) and Z(t), we
obtain the dynamics of UP (t), and then the HJB formulation of the principals problem by setting
the drift of the dynamics to 0. Using the dynamics of Wi(t) as in Equation (8), we get
dW (t) = r [W (t)−u(a(y(t)),c(t))]dt+ rY (t)σdB(t) (14)
and similarly using Equation (2), for Z(t). Here σ and σZ are n×m matrices and Y (t) = diag(y(t)).
Let the differential operator Hy with µ(t,W (t)) =W (t)−u(a(y(t)),c(t)) and σ(y) = Y σ be defined
as6:
HyFPt = rDwFPt µ(t,w(t)) + rDzFPt µz(a(t),c(t)) +
1
2
r2trace(σ(y(t))ᵀD2wF
P
t σ(y(t))) +σ
T
z D
2
zF
P
t σz) (15)
Applying the multidimensional Ito’s lemma, we get the drift of the dynamics of UP (t) as
e−rt
[
∂
∂t
FPt + ruP (a(y
∗(t)),c∗(t)) +HyFPt − rFPt
]
(16)
Thus the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation that results is:
∂
∂t
F Pt + max
y,c
{
ruP (a(y(t)),c(t)) +HyFPt
}− rFPt = 0 (17)
FP (T,w,z) = −r1ᵀ ·Φ(z) for all w,z (18)
a(y(t),c(t)) ∈ Θ(c(t),y(t)) for all t (19)
One can now use standard arguments to show that the stipulated function F P (t,w,z) does indeed
generate the optimal policy for the multi-agent problem. We omit this verification theorem here.
4 FP is once continuously differentiable in t and twice in the other two variables.
5 In what follows, for the ease of exposition we will shorten FP (t,W (t),Z(t)) to FPt whenever there is no possibility
of confusion.
6 In the formula DxF is the Jacobean and D
2
xF is the Hessian of the C
2 function F of x
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6. Solving the principal-multi-agent problem
The framework to solve the single-principal multi-agent problem is shown in Figure 1. Solving the
contracts adopt the backward scheme in time horizon. Fixing an arbitrary point (t,w,z), and an
arbitrary guess of the function FPt , we solve a fixed point problem, [5], to find the Nash Equilibrium
of n-agents’ actions for given contracts {c0,y0}. Then we solve a static optimization to find the
optimal contracts iteratively by possibly a gradient descent method in principal’s problem. The
function is then updated by solving the PDE for the unknown function F P . Unfortunately there
is no general analytic method to accelerate this guess-and-check process. In most cases, we can
only solve for some special functions, some examples of which include quadratic utility functions
of state w(t),z(t). One observation in the literature speculates that FP appears to inherent some
structural properties from uP and Φ[2]. In case that there is no explicit solution to PDE, we can
use numerical methods to solve the parabolic PDE.
Figure 1. Flowchart to solve the optimal contracts.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we prove the existence of optimal contracts in the multi-agent version of continuous-
time dynamic moral hazard. We are able to show that there is sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium
in a multi-agent system by imposing certain information, compactness and convexity conditions.
Similar to the single-agent model, we can use dynamic programming to solve the optimal con-
tracts as a series of static optimizations. The principal’s problem is converted to HJB equation.
Furthermore, a backward iteration algorithm to find the optimal contracts is provided.
In a future work, we will consider special cases and find the optimal contracts (possibly via
simulation) to obtain some understanding of the effect on the optimal contracts of the interactions
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between different types of agents. This could give some additional insights beyond ones obtained
from a single agent model. We expect to simulate continuous time moral hazard situations in tradi-
tional areas like finance and labor markets, and possibly new areas like energy and transportation.
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